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a b s t r a c t
Governments around the world, but especially in Europe, have increasingly used private sector
involvement in developing, ﬁnancing and providing public health infrastructure and service delivery
through publiceprivate partnerships (PPPs). Reasons for this uptake are manifold ranging from rising
expenditures for refurbishing, maintaining and operating public assets, and increasing constraints on
government budgets stiﬂe, seeking innovation through private sector acumen and aiming for better risk
management. Although PPPs have attracted practitioner and academic interest over the last two decades,
there has been no attempt to integrate the general and health management literature to provide a ho-
listic view of PPPs in healthcare delivery. This study analyzes over 1400 publications from a wide range of
disciplines over a 20-year time period. We ﬁnd that despite the scale and signiﬁcance of the phenom-
enon, there is relatively limited conceptualization and in-depth empirical investigation. Based on
bibliographic and content analyses, we synthesize formerly dispersed research perspectives into a
comprehensive multi-dimensional framework of public-private partnerships. In so doing, we provide
new directions for further research and practice.
 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/).
1. Introduction
European countries and indeed governments around the world
have increasingly turned to private sector involvement in the
development, ﬁnancing and provision of public infrastructure and
services (Maynard, 1986; Zheng et al., 2008; Mahoney et al., 2009;
Anderson, 2012). Their advocates argue that by promoting
increased diversity of provision and contestability, such ‘partner-
ships’ secure better quality infrastructure and services at ‘optimal’
cost and risk allocation (Kwak et al., 2009). Although conceptually a
public-private partnership (PPP) can be deﬁned relatively simply, as
“a long-term contract between a private party and a government
agency, for providing a public asset or service, in which the private
party bears signiﬁcant risk andmanagement responsibility” (World
Bank Institute, 2012: 11), there is variation in practice based on the
separation of ownership and risk-bearing between the public and
private sector actors (Fig. 1). This study focuses on PPPs deﬁned as
business models for linked infrastructure and services, excluding,
for instance, PPPs for drug research where private sector contri-
butions are of a more charitable nature.
Over the past decade, the use of PPPs has grown almost ﬁve-fold
(PWC, 2010), with nearly US$ 4 billion of health PPP contracts were
signedworldwide in 2010 alone (Carty, 2012). It is intriguing to note
therefore that despite their global prevalence, empirical evidence of
beneﬁts is mixed. Nonetheless, PPPs continue to be deployed for a
range of public sector infrastructure and service delivery. In the UK,
there are more than 600 PPPs in the form of Private Finance Initia-
tives (PFIs)worth overUS $100 billion for hospitals, schools, prisons,
bridges, roads and military equipment (HM Treasury, 2013). More
speciﬁcally there has been a sharp rise e again predominantly
within Europe/UK e in PPPs to deliver healthcare infrastructure
including buildings, large technology systems, clinical services, and
associated non-clinical maintenance and facility management ser-
vices (Barlow et al., 2013; Roehrich et al., 2013). The increasing
popularity of PPPs can also be observed in many other developed,
developing and emerging economies (e.g. English, 2005; Guasch
et al., 2008; Yang et al., 2013).
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Although the PPP phenomenon has attracted a wide range of
practitioner and academic comments, there is limited systematic
review of evidence and the literature remains largely fragmented
(Kivleniece and Quelin, 2012). In this article, we engage in a
comprehensive review of the PPP literature and published empir-
ical evidence to ask the following questions: (i) What is the current
state of public-private partnership research? and (ii) What are the
emerging themes of interest for health research? This study offers a
timely analysis of health PPP arrangements, constituting a large
proportion of PPPs around the world, rather than a broad overview
of PPPs (e.g. Kwak et al., 2009). We address these questions and
current limitations in the literature by developing a framework for
research based on comprehensive bibliographic and content ana-
lyses of over 1400 PPP papers published over the last two decades.
Following the suggestions by Ferlie et al. (2012), and in contrast
with narrow classiﬁcation approaches such as Pantouvakis and
Vandoros’ (2006) review of PPPs in construction, we include the
wider management literature alongside speciﬁc PPPs in the
healthcare context, thus accessing a broader range of ideas and
theoretical traditions.
The paper is structured as follows: After outlining the system-
atic review method, we analyze the PPP literature for speciﬁc
patterns and trends. We then offer a synthesis of PPP research,
distinguishing between speciﬁc themes connected to the policy
and practice of PPPs and their outcomes. The paper concludes by
proposing a multi-dimensional framework and drawing out im-
plications for both theory and practice.
2. Methods
The systematic review adopts an iterative review procedure and
search strategy e Fig. 2 e aimed at mitigating bias and deploying a
comprehensive search and analysis framework, incorporating
cross-referencing between researchers, extensive database
searches, and applying agreed exclusion criteria (Tranﬁeld et al.,
2003; Deneckere et al., 2012). Commencing with an initial
scoping study, seminal PPP papers were content analyzed using the
software package NVivo. This initial analysis established a focus for
the subsequent analysis stages by, for instance, specifying the
search period and search terms. In addition, eight subject experts
were interviewed to further improve the search strategy and search
terms. This led us, for instance, to explicitly consider both macro
policy dimensions and more operational processes such as stake-
holder management.
The analysis was conducted in two parts. In part I, the Web of
Knowledge database was searched for PPP-related publications
between 1990 and 2011. In part II, we focused on PPP research
papers published in diverse journals such as, but not limited to,
accounting and ﬁnance, strategic management, operations man-
agement, economics and healthcare. Based on published reviews
and journal ranking lists from the UK Association of Business
Schools and Web of Science rankings, we selected peer-reviewed
journals, because they exhibit high disciplinary standing and can
be considered validated knowledge (Podsakoff et al., 2005). This
ensured that the publications included had been subject to assur-
ance systems for academic quality and rigor (Lockett et al., 2006).
Subsequently, speciﬁc search terms were the subject of an
extensive consultation phase including all authors and a research
Fig. 1. Scale and scope of private and public responsibility.
(Adopted from: Canadian Council for PublicePrivate Partnerships, 2011; Deloitte, 2006; in Roehrich et al., 2013: 5).
Fig. 2. Summary of systematic review process.
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assistant. The terms included PFI, Private Finance Initiative, PPP,
Public Private Partnership, Private Finance Project, public or private
infrastructure projects, private sector contracting, risk transfer,
value for money, VfM, PFP, DBFO, BOOT, public infrastructure
project*, and inter organization* public private relationship*, public
non-proﬁt, public enterprise*, public alliance*, and non-proﬁt
partnership*. ISI Web of Knowledge is widely considered to be
the comprehensive database for scholarly work. The period 1990e
2011 was selected because relatively few PPP papers were pub-
lished before 1990 and this period provides sufﬁcient span to
enable a comprehensive and meaningful analysis. After reading the
abstracts, we excluded editorials, transcribed speeches, book re-
views and books for our subsequent analyses. All remaining papers
were then read and evaluated for inclusion by categorizing them
against an agreed set of inclusion criteria, ensuring that the papers
were: (i) focused on publiceprivate relationships; (ii) scholarly
publications; and (iii) of conceptual, quantitative or qualitative
empirical nature.
Data analysis was supported by NVivo to help summarize,
compare and contrast emergent themes. For example, key themes
such as risk management, stakeholder alignment and accounting
treatment emerged from in-depth analysis and facilitated the data
synthesis steps leading to a multi-dimensional framework. The
data synthesis and analysis, a key value-added element of a
comprehensive review (Crossan and Apaydin, 2010), consisted of
two parts. First, basic patterns of PPP publications were examined;
and second, themes e policy of PPPs, practice of PPPs and PPP
outcomes e across macro, meso and micro levels of analysis were
identiﬁed.
3. Analysis I: patterns of publication
Mirroring the upsurge in PPPs over the last two decades, Fig. 3
illustrates the increase in publications, including a number of
special issues, in a wide range of journals. Interestingly, the highest
proportion of practitioner-oriented papers was discovered in the
healthcare sector which is reﬂected by publications in health policy
and management journals such as Social Science & Medicine.
Although PPP has been subject to scrutiny by researchers from
various different disciplines, accountancy, ﬁnance and public
management perspectives predominate. That these areas are
particularly interested in PPP research is not surprising e after all,
notions of ﬁnancial value and risk transfer lie at the conceptual
heart of PPP, and public sector specialists should question policies
that inﬂuence the boundary of the state (Engel et al., 2013).
However, given that the phenomenon invokes overlapping issues
with various social, political and economic implications, a greater
diversity in the conceptual ecology might have been expected. For
instance, neither the organizational studies or strategic manage-
ment ﬁelds nor their functional management sub-ﬁelds, such as
procurement and supply management, human resources, and in-
formation systems management, have shown sustained interest.
Equally, given that PPPs are intended to inﬂuence boundaries, for
instance, between state and market, principle and agent, products
and services, very little research (with some notable exceptions, e.g.
Klijn and Teisman, 2003) has adopted a network perspective.
Articles also cover a number of different sectors with healthcare,
transport, housing and education being most prevalent. While PPP
publications in the 1990s focused mainly on the healthcare and
Fig. 3. Number of papers published on PPP over time (from 1990 to 2011).
Table 1
Differing conceptualizations of public-private partnerships.
Deﬁnition Dimensions
An arrangement between two or more entities
that enables them to work cooperatively
towards shared or compatible objectives and
in which there is some degree of shared
authority and responsibility, joint
investment of resources, shared risk taking,
and mutual beneﬁt (HM Treasury, 1998)
 Inter-organizational
relationship;
 Cooperation;
 Shared objectives;
 Joint investments;
 Risk sharing
Publiceprivate partnerships are on-going
agreements between government and
private sector organizations in which the
private organization participates in the
decision-making and production of a public
good or service that has traditionally been
provided by the public sector and in which
the private sector shares the risk of that
production (Forrer et al., 2010).
 Risk sharing
 Inter-organizational
relationship
A legally-binding contract between government
and business for the provision of assets and
the delivery of services that allocates
responsibilities and business risks among the
various partners (Partnerships British
Columbia, 2003)
 Contractual governance;
 Risk allocation
The main characteristic of a PPP, compared with
the traditional approach to the provision of
infrastructure, is that it bundles investment
and service provision in a single long term
contract. For the duration of the contract,
which can be as long as twenty or thirty
years, the concessionaire will manage and
control the assets, usually in exchange for
user fees, which are its compensation for the
investment and other costs. (Engel et al.,
2008).
 Bundling
 Service provision
 Long-term contract
Partnerships which includes contractual
arrangements, alliances, cooperative
agreements, and collaborative activities used
for policy development, program support
and delivery of government programs and
services (Osborne, 2000)
 Contractual governance;
 Inter-organizational
relationship
A relationship that consists of shared and/or
compatible objectives and an acknowledged
distribution of speciﬁc roles and
responsibilities among the participants
which can be formal or informal, contractual
or voluntary, between two or more parties.
The implication is that there is a cooperative
investment of resources and therefore joint
risk-taking, sharing of authority, and beneﬁts
for all partners (Lewis, 2002)
 Inter-organizational
relationship;
 Shared objectives;
 Mutual investments
 Risk sharing
 Beneﬁt sharing
A relationship involving the sharing of power,
work, support and/or information with
others for the achievements of joint goals
and/or mutual beneﬁts (Kernaghan, 1993)
 Inter-organizational
relationship;
 Cooperation;
 Power and information
sharing
 Shared objectives
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transport sectors, there was a trend towards other sectors such as
urban redevelopment, prisons, and education from the early 2000s
(e.g. Cabral et al., 2010). There were few cross-industry studies that
capture the variants in PPP arrangements including different sec-
tors, project sizes and ownership structures. Perhaps inevitably this
diversity has meant that the speciﬁc deﬁnition and type of PPP
project is often variable and sometimes unclear (see Table 1).
To date the predominant countries for PPP research have been
the USA and UK (63% of the total PPP-related publication) but, just
as PPPs are gaining prominence elsewhere, there is now a growing
body of work focusing on both developed economies (Germany,
Netherlands and Australia) and, increasingly, developing countries
such as India and Lebanon (Fig. 4). Although relatively limited,
there is a promising body of international comparative work such
as Boxmeer and Beckhoven’s (2005) study of Dutch and Spanish
urban regeneration PPPs.
Problematically, there is no consistency or cumulative devel-
opment with regard to, for instance, methodology, units of analysis,
key ﬁndings and sample. Indeed, a relatively high number of papers
does not mention or clarify their research methodology. The case
study approach tends to be the primary data collection method at
the project and inter-organizational level of analysis, with more
limited use of a surveymethodology. Surprisingly, despite the long-
term nature of most PPPs, there is only limited evidence of publi-
cations adopting a longitudinal or process perspective (e.g.
Roehrich and Caldwell, 2012). Prior publications address ‘whole
life-cycle’ issues in PPPs by primarily relating to important themes
such as costing analysis. However, other important whole life-cycle
management issues such as staff turnover and relationship man-
agement remain neglected and therefore constitute fruitful further
research avenues. Table 2 summarizes an illustrative selection of
PPP articles, highlighting how authors have studied PPPs at various
levels of analysis, adopting different theoretical lenses and
emphasizing diverse key dimensions.
4. Analysis II: emerging PPP research themes
In order to clarify the state of the art of PPP knowledge and pave
the way for future research, this section provides a summary and
critical reﬂection on the key themes e PPP outcomes, the policy of
PPPs, the practice of PPPs e identiﬁed by the review. We
acknowledge that there are thematic overlaps between sub-
sections, but it is the level of analysis that acts as a key dis-
tinguishing factor. More speciﬁcally, while the Policy theme focuses
on the macro, the Practice theme focuses on the meso and micro
levels.
4.1. PPP outcomes
The theme ‘focuses on the beneﬁts and disadvantages of
deploying PPP arrangements. Extant literature offers an incoherent
picture of PPP outcomes with regards to its beneﬁts and disad-
vantages. Potential beneﬁts put forward include the freedom to
allow public sector to concentrate on, for example, the provision of
clinical services and increased efﬁciency in project delivery realized
by the private sector (Barlow et al., 2013). However, there is a sig-
niﬁcant number of studies raising concerns over PPP performance:
it may stiﬂe improvements because of limited contractor capacity
compared to project size, that transaction costs are too high
throughout the project life-cycle, there is limited integration be-
tween clinical service models and infrastructure design and de-
livery, and limited innovation in new-build healthcare PPPs (Barlow
and Köberle-Gaiser, 2009).
Studies conclude that hospital build quality is not unambigu-
ously better for PFIs, and facilities management services provide
actually lower value for money (VfM) when compared to non-PFI
hospitals (Liebe and Pollock, 2009; Pollock et al., 2011). There is
also a critique that notions such as VfM and risk transfer are
regularly conﬂated; leading to spurious conclusions regarding
beneﬁts and costs. English (2005), for example, used the failure of
the Latrobe Regional Hospital in Australia as a reminder of both the
importance and the difﬁculty of VfM estimates. In the UK, PFI ar-
rangements have been criticized on all these points and ample
concern has been stated about the cost of the debt and incurred risk
in comparison to government borrowing (Liebe and Pollock, 2009).
4.2. The policy of PPP
Subthemes in this section are mainly concerned with macro-
level reﬂections on ﬁnance issues such as accounting treatment,
risk allocation, and policy concerns such as the general appropri-
ateness and ﬁt of PPPs for delivering public sector infrastructure
and services.
The often-stated policy aim of PPPs, part of the New Public
Management logic, is to achieve higher efﬁciency by bundling in-
vestments, infrastructure and service delivery (Boyne, 2002; Engel
et al., 2013) in order to draw on expertise and sometimes ﬁnancial
resources, as illustrated by UK PFIs, from the private sector (Hood,
1995). Additionally, it is suggested that working with private
sector companies may allow public sector organizations to access
idiosyncratic resources and capabilities in seeking to realize more
innovative responses and, for instance, improved health services
quality (Kivleniece and Quelin, 2012). This is in stark contrast to a
Fig. 4. Country focus of PPP publications.
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purely contracting out approach where the public sector “hands
over” public sector infrastructure and service provision to the pri-
vate provider with limited control or involvement. Set against these
normative policy assertions however is the equally prevalent
critique that such ‘partnerships’ are essentially political symbols
and political choices (‘PPP or nothing’: Lonsdale, 2005a). As a policy
tool, they are simply an attempt to respond to infrastructure
shortfalls at a time of budgetary constraints by moving expendi-
tures off-budget and transferring costs on to future governments/
taxpayers (Linder, 1999; Winch, 2000).
Extant literature does not offer empirical analyses deploying, for
example, longitudinal estimates of the success of moving expen-
ditures off-balance sheet. This gap offers fruitful avenues to
strengthen evidence around the (dis-)beneﬁts of PPP arrange-
ments. Similarly, there are enduring concerns that by involving
private organizations in government decision-making, the dy-
namics of public accountability are changing (Forrer et al., 2010). No
matter how legitimate these criticisms may be, the themes iden-
tiﬁed by the systematic reviewwere focused on articles that engage
with PPPs as a signiﬁcant policy reality and seek to deploy them as
effectively as possible. It highlighted three speciﬁc themes.
There remains a meaningful debate regarding the contingent
appropriateness of speciﬁc PPPs for the delivery of public infra-
structure in different sectors. Our analysis shows that there is no
coherent picture emerging from practice. For example, Torres and
Pina’s (2001) survey of PPPs across EU local governments shows
that themajority of these projects are associatedwith activities that
are not typically core public services. In contrast, PPPs in the UK and
USA have been deployed in delivering hospitals, schools and de-
fense systems (Brinkerhoff and Brinkerhoff, 2011). Walder and
Amenta (2004) conclude that PPPs are best suited for medium-
sized projects which can function as stand-alone entities with a
low-risk proﬁle. When considering whether to deploy public-
private partnerships, attention needs to be drawn to possible po-
wer and information asymmetries. Some authors argue that public
sector organizations often assume sub-ordinate roles in PPPs which
may trap them into post-contractual ‘lock-in situations’ considering
the length of these contracts (Lonsdale, 2005a).
Moreover, risk management and ﬁnancial evaluation in PPPs
continue to attract much attention (e.g. Froud and Shaoul, 2001;
Ball et al., 2003). Risk transfer plays a crucial role for achieving
value formoney in PPPs, but questions such as which risks aremore
appropriately allocated to the public sector and which may be
better shared between partners still remain highly contested (Bing
et al., 2005). A number of studies draw attention to the dysfunc-
tional effects of lengthy and expensive contract negotiation periods
(Dixon et al., 2005), suggesting that there is still no clarity
regarding, for instance, the types of risk that can be transferred to
the private sector and when they can be transferred (Froud, 2003;
Hodge, 2004; Lonsdale, 2005b). To date there is limited research
exploring risk and beneﬁt sharing between partnering organiza-
tions and across the whole PPP project network; despite the
repeated observation that (dysfunctional) extended contract
negotiation is the direct consequence of risk allocation and quan-
tiﬁcation at the outset of the inter-organizational relationship
(Iossa and Martimort, 2012).
Table 2
Publiceprivate partnerships: conceptualization and operationalization issues (The studies listed are representative rather than exhaustive).
Unit of analysis Study Method/Data Study focus Key dimensions Outcomes/Conclusions
Country Broadbent and
Laughlin (2003)
Conceptual New Public Management/
Modernization
Financial management and
accounting
Modernization of the UK state
to justify PFI projects
Deakin (2002) Conceptual Policy; partnership;
social exclusion
Accountability; power Problems of accountability;
top-down partnership; power
asymmetries
Grout (2003) Report analysis Accounting treatments Accounting for PFI projects Roles of Treasury, NAO;
fragmented views and
interests on accounting
treatments
Hodge (2004) Conceptual Incentives/risks;
procurement processes
Ownership; risk transfer;
incentives
Ex-ante competition; accessing
rare skills; better risk management;
economies of scale
Project/Wider
Network
Barlow and
Köberle-Gaiser
(2008)
Case studies (6) Public procurement policy Innovation; project delivery;
relationship management;
adaptability
PFI has increased the complexity
at the inter-face between project
delivery and hospital operational
functions, resulting in a project
delivery model which yields less
innovative outcomes.
Bing et al. (2005) Survey
(53 respondents)
Procurement processes/
risk allocation
Risk allocation/risk
identiﬁcation
Some risks should be shared while
others are better managed by
individual partners
de Bettignies and
Ross (2004)
Conceptual Incentives/risks;
procurement processes
Ownership; risk transfer;
incentives
Ex-ante competition; accessing
rare skills; better risk management;
economies of scale
Dixon et al. (2005) Case studies
(11 interviews)
PFI process and development PFI success factors and
beneﬁts
Improvements in Value for money
(VfM) assessment, end-user needs,
developing competitive markets;
skills in public sector
Inter-organization Essig and
Batran (2006)
Case study (1) Relationship management;
TCE; contracting
Contracts; decision making The decision on publiceprivate
cooperation is not driven only
by economic principles.
Lonsdale (2005b) Case studies (2) TCE; relationship
management; contracting
Risk transfer; accounting
treatments; opportunism;
VfM outcomes; contracting
Importance of when and not
whether risks are transferred
in PPP projects.
Zheng et al. (2008) Case studies (2) Relationship management;
TCE; contracting theory
Contracts; trust; governance
interplay
Relational and contractual
governance mechanisms are
complementary forms of exchange
governance.
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Further research could explore the relationship between risk
management, innovation, and other proposed positive outcomes
from PPP arrangements, and whether risk management and in-
centives are effective instruments of PPP governance. The review
draws attention to the need for standardization of risk assessment
tools, appropriate pricing of risks and the improvement of trans-
parency through the availability of historical data for quantifying
risks ex-ante and selecting the most appropriate private partner.
Another challenge of risk transfer is associated with a limited de-
gree of market competition due to a low number of bidders and
market entry barriers (Hall, 1998). For instance, Romzek and
Johnston (2002) ﬁnd that contracting partners face barriers such
as a lack of management and contract negotiation skills, high
participation costs, high project values, project risks and demands
on management time.
Closely related to research on risk allocation mechanisms is the
consideration of accounting treatments of PPPs (e.g. Broadbent and
Laughlin, 2003). Some commentators are concerned that account-
ing treatments may turn out to be the leading motive behind PPPs,
so that “governments may not take the care to properly design
contracts to ensure that appropriate incentives are in place” (Mintz
and Smart, 2006: 21). The value for money assessment involves a
so-called public sector comparator (PSC), a process that has been
described as ‘surreal’ and can lead to sub-optimal decision making
(Heald, 2003). Shaoul (2005) suggests that limited reliable evi-
dence for PPPs is available due to the inappropriate methods used
for quantifying cost savings and accessing ﬁnancial risks ex-ante
and ex-post. A study by Engel et al. (2013) argues that the alloca-
tion of risk under the optimal contracting arrangement suggests
that PPPs are closer to public provision than to privatization.
4.3. The practice of PPPs
The Practice theme focuses on the micro and meso, which mean
inter-personal and inter-organizational, levels of PPPs, including
sub-themes such as transferring lessons learnt from one PPP
project to subsequent projects, incentives and contract issues
across inter-organizational relationships and the management of
stakeholders in these complex PPPs. The subset of the literature
that explores PPP practice highlights a number of speciﬁc ‘viability
criteria’ (e.g. Walder and Amenta, 2004). First, the intrinsic
complexity of PPP arrangements results in the need for robust and
appropriate performance regimes. Surprisingly, our analysis reveals
there is limited understanding of the interplay between
performance-based contracts, incentive mechanisms and subse-
quent service performance; with much of the speciﬁc research on
incentives being conceptual (e.g. Hart, 2003; Bennette and Iossa,
2006). Exceptions, such as the study by Ng and Wong (2007) on
performance-based payment in maintenance services, have
emphasized the potential for performance management systems to
undermine PPP arrangements.
Grout (1997) notes that when private companies are mainly
remunerated for successful delivery of services, their incentive
structure focuses on cost minimization and not on service
enhancing activities. Similarly, studies that draw attention to the
lack of innovation realized by PPPs (e.g. Barlow and Köberle-Gaiser,
2008) attribute this, at least in part, to inappropriate or missing
performance incentives. When the UK’s PFI program was initiated
for example, there was a clear recognition that life-cycle costing
systems were necessary to realize innovative approaches to the
delivery of higher quality buildings. More than two decades later,
research highlights that this approach, and by corollary, these
beneﬁts have not been achieved (Barlow and Köberle-Gaiser, 2009).
Similar criticism emerged from reviewed PPP projects in Europe,
North-America and Australia (e.g. Hodge and Greve, 2007; Pollock
et al., 2011). Considering incentives across the supply network,
there is signiﬁcant scope for further research to investigate how
performance management regimes and speciﬁc incentives are
passed on from the primary publiceprivate relationship to subse-
quent tiers of sub-contractors. Similar research highlights the bar-
riers for integrating SMEs in supply chains related to payment
issues, missing early supplier involvement and a misalignment of
inter-organizational systems (Dainty et al., 2001).
Second, in examining current practices of knowledge manage-
ment and learning in and across PPP projects, research points to a
lack of knowledge and information retention. For example,
Akintoye et al. (2003) argue that the availability of appropriate
information management systems is particularly important in
these long-term relationships as they are characterized by high
staff turnover. Learning has been acknowledged as a vital compo-
nent for achieving successful project outcomes (Schoﬁeld, 2004).
Extant literature also suggests that PPPs provide greater learning
opportunities through learning cycles between different, but
interdependent, project stages (Brady et al., 2005). Barriers to
learning for public actors include the limited repeatability of PPP
projects (Erridge and Greer, 2002) and a lack of reliable and
consistent data which has also been identiﬁed as a main barrier to
the successful implementation of whole lifecycle costing ap-
proaches (El-Haram et al., 2002). To overcome these barriers it may
be vital to establish close cooperation to enable inter-
organizational learning and knowledge transfer (Kivleniece and
Quelin, 2012).
Third, several operational issues emerge from the nature of the
interface between private and public organizations. The network of
relationships in a ‘typical’ PPP includes technical and ﬁnancial ad-
visers, funders and investors, government departments and users
of public assets and services (Ramiah and Reich, 2006) and it is
widely asserted in the literature that these PPP networks differ
from other inter-organizational relationships and hence a different
skillset is needed for managing them (Noble and Jones, 2006).
Somewhat ironically, given that their avowed purpose is to access
the additional capabilities of the private partners, several research
studies note the problematic impact of asymmetric skills between
public and private actors (Dixon et al., 2005; Akintoye et al., 2003).
While public actors were found to have limited abilities to engage
in strategic planning with private actors, private actors have been
criticized for their purely commercially driven outlook of public-
private partnerships.
This research stream highlights the lack of internal and external
stakeholder involvement and alignment as a main cause for prob-
lems across PPPs. For instance, seeking input from clinicians in the
design and procurement stage of healthcare PPPs may lead to more
innovative project outcomes (Barlow and Köberle-Gaiser, 2008).
Further PPP research should investigate the optimal balance of
skills and capabilities between public and private partners. Those
investigations directly question, for instance, the extent to which
public sector services such as medical services should be provided
by public or private partners. With regard to external stakeholder
alignment, extant literature illustrates the importance of estab-
lishing and maintaining inter-organizational trust. Similarly,
Koppenjan (2005) draws attention to the importance of early in-
teractions between public and private actors. Frequent early in-
teractions help to facilitate information sharing during the contract
negotiation phase (Zheng et al., 2008). Also, the importance of
developing inter-organizational trust is seen to be a crucial factor
for private actor’s bidding decisions. Zitron’s (2006) research study,
for example, concludes that bidding decisions are based on
comprehensive risk assessments and the perception of commit-
ment trust as a crucial factor inﬂuencing private actors’ perception
of risks during the bidding phase. Further research should
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investigate how information and power asymmetry might impact
on stakeholder alignment in PPP arrangements.
Fourth, concerns exist on the implementation of governance
mechanisms (Ball et al., 2003; Lonsdale, 2005b) that together co-
ordinate actors, resources and activities over an extended period of
time (Zheng et al., 2008). With respect to the use of formal con-
tracts, in addition to offering legal enforceability by acting as
safeguards against future contingencies and providing guidance for
conﬂict resolutions (Deakin et al., 1997), the literature suggests that
contracts can play a vital role in managing long-term PPP re-
lationships. Contracts can clarify partnering parties’ responsibilities
and provide an effective risk allocation mechanism (Luo, 2002).
However, the effectiveness of PPP contracts is mitigated by prob-
lems of incompleteness as partnering organizations cannot foresee
every single future contingency (Froud, 2003; Ruﬁn and Rivera-
Santos, 2010). Similarly, with an increased number of parties
involved, governance costs can be expected to rise as well (Rangan
et al., 2006). Extant literature draws attention to contracting
problems associated with bundling the design, build, ﬁnance and
operation phases of these long-term projects within a single con-
tract. Martimort and Pouyet (2008), for example, argue that when
performance contracts can be written, tasks should be performed
together by the same ﬁrm as a better design of the infrastructure
also helps to save operating costs. While long-term contracts may
encourage commitment and stability in PPPs, they can also face
problems with over-dependency and complacency. For instance,
Dixon et al. (2005) argued that a major concern in PPPs across
various sectors is the lack of ﬂexibility in governing contracts.
A private partner’s commitment to innovation may be con-
strained by such complex contracts with rigid speciﬁcations. In
addition, research shows that contracting parties need to be able to
specify service quality ex-ante, or to ensure the availability of
appropriate and measurable performance indicators that reward or
penalize service providers on an on-going basis (Hart, 2003). While
prior literature argues for collaborative relationships as coordi-
nating mechanisms for inter-organizational networks (Koppenjan,
2005), empirical research has uncovered that many PPPs are
characterized by relationships of a non-collaborative nature (Klijn
and Teisman, 2003). Collaborative partnerships in health PPPs are
difﬁcult to establish and maintain because of barriers such as an
imbalance of power, value and partnership goals between public
and private partners (Ramiah and Reich, 2006). The extent towhich
contractual and relational governance mechanisms are deployed in
public-private partnerships may also be inﬂuenced by various
Fig. 5. Literature map of PPPs.
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political, social, ideological and legal factors (Essig and Batran,
2006). Essig and Batran (2006) illustrate that the particular
choice of contracts is highly inﬂuenced by the strategic importance
and speciﬁcity of individual goods and services. Limited research
has explored the dynamic relationship of governance mechanisms
over a long-term PPP lifecycle. A notable exception is Grubnic and
Hodge’s (2003) study showing that in the absence of trust during
early relationship stages, a far more extensive set of contractual
clauses is likely to be negotiated and applied during the course of
the relationship.
5. Synthesis and implications
Bringing together the three key themes e PPP outcomes, the
policy of PPPs, the practice of PPPs e and their corresponding sub-
themes across different levels of analysis emacro, meso and micro
e we propose a multi-dimensional framework (Fig. 5). Such a
literature map, integrating the manifold research streams, should
provide the basis for advancing both research and practice. The
systematic literature review emphasizes a distinct divide across the
three ‘building blocks’ e the policy of PPPs, the practice of PPPs and
PPP outcomes e with very limited research spanning across the
three distinct, yet inter-related, themes. For instance, while the
policy of PPPs theme mainly draws out the beneﬁts of deploying
PPPs to justify the use of these partnerships for public sector
infrastructure and service delivery, prior literature concerned with
the practice of PPPs draws on the disadvantages of these
partnerships.
5.1. Limitations and further research
This study has its limitations, some of which can stimulate
future research. First, the goal was analyze and synthesize prior
research, not generate detailed hypotheses. Second, this review
deployed the ISI Web of Knowledge database. While aiming for a
comprehensive coverage by following rigorous, systematic review
and synthesis procedures, the database selection and ﬁltering
processes may have omitted relevant research. Third, deploying an
analytical framework for such a multi-dimensional concept of
public-private partnership highlights some previously under-
researched linkages while failing to capture others. With further
operationalization, it could form the basis for empirically testing
PPPs across different countries and sectors by encapsulating the
three distinct, yet inter-related, themes. Additionally, further
research could examine the performance of health PPPs by
comparative analysis using matched pairs of public and PPP hos-
pitals of similar vintage, size and catchment population, to examine
whether a public solution is better than a PPP arrangement. This
future research avenue would offer well-grounded empirical evi-
dence on whether and how PPP arrangements may succeed in
achieving some of the beneﬁts ascribed to them.
5.2. Managerial and policy implications
Our research has managerial and policy implications; we high-
light two pragmatic themes that will help maximize the realized
beneﬁts from the public-private nexus. First, although accessing
strategic private sector resources and realizing apparent cost sav-
ings (depending on the accounting treatment) are vital consider-
ations for managers and policy makers engaging with health
public-private partnerships, these public actors also need to
actively consider how the capabilities associated with more oper-
ational processes (e.g. negotiating, specifying and monitoring ser-
vices) can have signiﬁcant, positive and negative, impact on macro
policy objectives. Second, managers and policy makers need to
reﬂect more fully on their use of incentive mechanisms. In addition
to targeting the focal public-private dyad, what behaviors/perfor-
mance are being encouraged in the ‘total’ PPP network? Moreover,
given the performance impact of a sustained emphasis on inter-
organizational learning across the total lifecycle of the PPP, in-
centives should be carefully designed to drive both short and long-
term innovations.
6. Conclusions
We began this article with the observation that in spite of the
scale and scope of PPPs, there remain important gaps in scholarly
and practitioner understanding of how the concept has been
applied. We set out to examine the foundations of the PPP litera-
ture, ﬁrstly exploring the patterns of publications and then parsing
the research into policy and practice meta-themes. From this sys-
tematic analysis and synthesis of PPP research, conclusions can be
derived for public and private healthcare actors in particular and for
the management ﬁeld in general.
Public-private partnerships can combine the strengths of private
actors, such as innovation, technical knowledge and skills, mana-
gerial efﬁciency and entrepreneurial spirit, and the role of public
actors, including social responsibility, social justice, public
accountability and local knowledge, to create an enabling environ-
ment for delivering high quality health infrastructure and services.
Through these partnerships, public and private actors may realize
beneﬁts such as the creation of jobs, educational development, in-
centives for innovation and competition and health infrastructure
development. However, the study illustrates that while the popu-
larity of deploying PPPs is steadily rising; further empirical research
needs to explore evidence gaps. For instance, future research should
develop a richer understanding of the circumstances for creating
alliances between private and public actors from a strategy
perspective, explore the impact of incentive mechanisms and risk
managementprocedures onhealth service performance throughout
the extended project life-cycle, and to create conducive environ-
ments to foster inter-project learning. Future work can investigate
the causes behind PPP failures across different sectors and countries
to draw out guidance on when (in terms of sector and service de-
livery speciﬁcs) and to what extent (in terms of whether to include
sensitive service delivery such as medical services) PPP arrange-
ments should be favored. Thus, research can investigate the limi-
tations of PPP arrangements in delivering public sector
infrastructure and services. These proposed research avenues will
help integrate the private, political and social perspectives at the
public-private nexus in health public-private partnerships.
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